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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JAMES B. EARLE*
Questions of the scope and timing of judicial review of administra-
tive agency action were again before the courts during the period
covered by this survey.
Timing of Judicial Review: The problem of "timing" of judicial
review of administrative action includes questions of the availability
of administrative remedies and whether their exhaustion must be
required before court action; ripeness for review, usually associated
with the issuance of agency rules and regulations; and jurisdictional
questions vis-a-vis the agency and the court.
The latter question may be referred to in terms of "primary juris-
diction" or as "exclusive administrative jurisdiction," "prior resort,"
or "preliminary resort."' The primary jurisdiction doctrine refers to
the question whether the administrative agency has jurisdiction in-
itially to consider a matter to the exclusion of the courts. The doc-
trine was formulated in the case of Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co.2 There Abilene was attempting to recover reparation
for alleged shipping overcharges. Notwithstanding that the Inter-
state Commerce Act provided that suits to recover such overcharges
might be brought in federal courts, the Supreme Court found that
overbearing considerations of uniformity in the application of the act
required that shippers seeking reparation must "primarily invoke re-
dress through the Interstate Commerce Commission." The application
of the doctrine is usually explained on the basis that the legislature,
having created a body of special expertness and experience, may re-
quire that certain matters be initially resolved by that body.3
In Breeden v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,4 citizens of Jefferson
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. See DAVIs, ADMISTRA=T LAW 664 (1951).
2. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
3. Among federal agencies, in addition to the-Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been applied to some matters
within the ambit of such agencies as the Federal Maritime Board, Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); the Civil Aeronautics Board,
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); the National Labor
Relations Board, Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261 (1940); and the National R.R. Adjustment Bd., Slocum v. Delaware,
L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950).
4. 285 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. 1955).
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County sought by injunction to compel the telephone company to
extend service to a particular area within the county and sought to
recover the statutory penalty for failure to provide service.5 The
Code,6 then section 5451 of Williams Tennessee Code, authorizes the
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission to require, after notice and
hearing, public utilities to make reasonable extensions of service. The
Tennessee Supreme Court, comparing what was sought in this case
to the regulation of service and rates of common carriers, held that
the action of the Commission must first be obtained in order to
require such an extension of service. In the light of the reasons for
applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, i.e., the familiarity of
the agency with the special problems and procedures of the utility,
the result is practical as well as fair,7 particularly in the case of such
a well-established agency as this Commission.
A similar result was reached in Kingsport Util. v. Steadman,8 which
involved condemnation of land by a public utility. There the federal
district court said that determination, under section 65-2201 of the
Tennessee Code Annotated, of what is "necessary or advisable" in the
way of land to be condemned for a public purpose is an "administra-
tive" rather than a judicial question. Of course, in such a situation the
utility itself may be exercising the administrative authority.
Another aspect of timing of judicial review of agency action is
the sometimes requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted
before the aid of the court is sought.9 This rule was applied in
State ex rel. Jones v. Nashville.10 In that case a former employee
of the city sought by mandamus to require restoration to his former
civil service position. It appeared, however, that the petitioner had
rested on his rights and had failed to take the administrative appeal
provided by the regulations within the time provided, so that there
was, in fact, no further administrative remedy which he might ex-
haust. At first blush the application of the rule to such a situation
might appear anomalous. Not so, however, when it is considered that
one of the prime reasons for applying the rule in any case is that the
agency is in a better position than the court from the standpoint of
gathering and understanding the evidence and, as the court states,
"ordinarily men in administering that position can be and should be
presumed to do the correct thing and if given a full chance to fully
5. TENx. CODE ANN. § 65-2111 (1956).
6. TENN. CODE Awx. § 65-414 (1956).
7. The primary jurisdiction doctrine has been justly criticized when applied
to some situations. See, e.g., Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction
and the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J. 495 (1953).
8. 139 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
9. See DAVIS, ADmamISTRATIV LAW 614 (1951); Berger, Exhaustion of Ad-
ministrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); Stason, Timing of Judicial
Redress from Erroneous Administrative Action, 25 MINN. L. REV. 560 (1941).
10. 279 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1955).
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pass upon the matter they will determine it correctly."" So a
litigant who, by his own fault, has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies may be left where he placed himself.
2
It was urged in this case that it probably would have been futile
to take the administrative appeal. The court answered that contention,
citing a leading case from California,13 by stating that the mere fact
that the administrative authorities might deny relief is no ground for
asserting the futility of the administrative action. This statement is
tempered by the inference made that in cases of "absolute futility"
exhaustion might not be required.
,Scope of Judicial Review: Tennessee has normally applied the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule to judicial review of most findings of fact by
administrative agencies.' 4 That is, ordinary determinations of fact,
if supported by substantial evidence in the record, will not be over-
turned by the court. The leading recent Tennessee case on this point
is Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n,'5
which is frequently pointed out by the supreme court as stating the
present scope of review of agency fact determinations.
The Hoover case was referred to and its doctrine applied in Con-
tinental Tennessee Lines v. Fowler.16 Involved in the Continental case
was the revocation of a certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate a section of a bus line because of abandonment by the motor
carrier.17 The supreme court found that there was substantial or ma-
terial evidence to support the determination of the Public Service
Commission and affirmed the decree of the chancellor upholding the
Commission. 18
An important area of scope of judicial review appears to have been
carved out of such cases as the Hoover case in Southern Continental
Tel. Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n.19 At least since 1920 there
has existed a narrowing area of cases in which the scope of judicial
review of agency action is considerably broader than in the "ordinary"
case. These are cases of rate-making by agencies where a denial of
11. 279 S.W.2d at 268.
12. See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
13. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 132
A.L.R. 715 (1941). Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24
(1934).
14. See discussion in Sanders, Administrative Law-1955 Tennessee Survey,
8 VAND. L. REV. 940, 945 (1955); Sanders, Administrative Law-1954 Tennessee
Survey, 7 VAmD. L. REV. 733, 741 (1954); Lacey, Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action in Tennessee-Scope of Review, 23 TENN. L. REV. 349
(1954).
15. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
16. 287 S.W.2d 22 (Tenn. 1956).
17. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1514 (1956).
18. See also Presson v. Benton County Beer Bd., 281 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn.
1955),. indicating a more restricted scope of review over actions by some
agencies.
19. 285 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. 1955).
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due process, under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, by confiscation is alleged. Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough20 constitutes the headwaters of this stream. In
that case a Pennsylvania statute which was construed as denying to
the courts in rate-making cases the power to exercise an independent
judgment on the question of confiscation was held to be violative of
the due process clause. The Ben Avon decision was followed in,
but its impact modified somewhat by, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States21 where the Court stated that "Judicial judgment may
be none the less appropriately independent because informed and
aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency." 22 The
Ben Avon and St. Joseph cases have not been overruled, although
commentators extract considerable authority from later cases to
indicate that the stream has pretty well petered out.23
On rehearing of the Southern Continental case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court felt itself bound by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Ben Avon case on the question of scope of
review of alleged confiscation in rate-making cases and reversed its
prior inconsistent (unpublished) holding.
The final disposition of this case by the court, however, leads to
the conclusion that the modification contained in the St. Joseph case,
that independent judicial evaluation may be exercised on the basis of
the evidence already in the record, is the keystone of the opinion. For
the Court stated, "This decision [St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States] of the United States Supreme Court is likewise conclusive here.
Hence, since the Chancellor gave no consideration to the Commission's
Exhibit B, it is necessary, in any view of the matter, to remand the
case for further consideration by the Chancellor to the end that
findings and conclusions in accordance with the independent judg-
ment of the Chancellor guided by the rules herein stated shall be
decreed."24 This view of the case leads to the belief that the exercise
of the "independent judgment of the court" required by the Ben Avon
case may be satisfied in Tennessee by a review to ascertain if there is
"substantial evidence" in the record as a whole to support the agency
determination,2 without the necessity of allowing a trial de novo.
Other administrative law cases during the period of the survey
20. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
21. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
22. Id. at 53.
23. See, e.g., DAVIs, ADMN-ISTRATnE LAw 919 (1951); Benjamin, Judicial
Review of Administrative Adjudication, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19 (1948). And
see also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951),
not, however, involving rate-making. For a contrary view, see Opinion of
the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952).
24. 285 S.W.2d at 117.
25. On the "whole record" aspect, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951).
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considered questions of the standing of private citizens to obtain a
hearing on an application for a beer permit;6 the application of the
Teacher Tenure Act of 1951,27 which was held not to be retrospective in
its operation;28 and the jurisdiction of the State Board of Claims29
to hear a damage action arising from the actions of a drunken
prisoner driving a state truck.30
26. Manuel v. Eckel, 285 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1955) (standing was denied).
27. TENN. CODE AIw. § 49-1401 (1956).
28. Shannon v. Board of Education, 286 S.W.2d 571 (Tenn. 1955).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-801 (1956).
30. Hill v. Beeler, 286 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1956).
